

# A NEW DIRECTION



## COMPETITION FOR INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL IN AMERICA ACT

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COMMITTEE

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MATERIALS SUBCOMMITTEE



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# COMPETITION FOR INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL IN AMERICA

## INTRODUCTION:

For forty years, Amtrak has established a record of poor performance and has relied on huge federal subsidies. It's time for a **new direction** in high-speed and intercity passenger rail for America. We must bring an end to massive, ineffective government handouts, encourage competition, and bring private sector efficiency, innovation, and financial support into Amtrak's operations.

Instead of throwing more taxpayer dollars down the drain for Amtrak's Soviet-style rail service, we can do more with less by leveraging private sector investment and increasing competition. To accomplish this, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman John Mica and Railroads Subcommittee Chairman Bill Shuster have developed a three-tiered initiative to take American passenger rail in a bold new direction. This plan includes:

### **NORTHEAST CORRIDOR COMPETITION INITIATIVE:**

This initiative will establish real high-speed rail and double intercity passenger rail service on the nation's Northeast Corridor (NEC) between Washington DC, New York City, and Boston through a private sector partnership and competitive bid process. By opening the door to competition, we can actually bring real high-speed rail to the NEC in one-third of the time and at significantly less cost than Amtrak's own "vision." This provides a stark contrast to Amtrak's thirty-year, \$117 billion proposal.

### **INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL COMPETITION INITIATIVE:**

The Intercity Passenger Rail Competition Initiative will give States greater control and authority over their passenger rail services. Currently, 15 States pay Amtrak to operate on "state-supported corridors." This initiative will incentivize these States to competitively bid passenger rail services. Head-to-head private sector competition with Amtrak will save money and improve passenger rail service.

### **LONG-DISTANCE PASSENGER RAIL COMPETITION INITIATIVE:**

The Long-Distance Passenger Rail Competition Initiative will finally bring competition to Amtrak's least successful lines in an effort to reduce federal subsidies and improve service. Amtrak's Long-Distance routes are subsidized at an incredible \$117.84 per passenger on average. Head-to-head competition will give the private sector the opportunity to resuscitate these half-dead, money-losing routes that Amtrak has failed to effectively operate.

# PART I: NORTHEAST CORRIDOR COMPETITION

## AN UNDERUTILIZED ASSET

*The NEC is stuck at the station, with low-speed service and flat ridership. As high-speed trains around the world speed by, the U.S. continues to cling to an antique relic – Amtrak.*

The NEC is one of the most valuable transportation assets in the United States, providing the only continuous physical link, along with I-95, between the major population centers of Washington, DC, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York City, and Boston. The NEC region constitutes the sixth largest economy in the world, with a GDP of approximately \$2.6 trillion and a population equal to the United Kingdom.

Amtrak, the government-subsidized intercity passenger rail provider, owns and controls nearly the entire NEC. Despite major capital improvement projects on the NEC costing taxpayers nearly \$6 billion, Amtrak's Acela averages only 83 mph from Washington, DC to New York City and 65 mph from New York City to Boston.



Amtrak has proven itself to be a poor steward of taxpayer dollars on the NEC. For example:

- NEC capital improvements included nearly \$1 billion in cost overruns;
- Amtrak mis-designed the Acela tilt mechanism, which required modifications and reduced speed;
- Equipment malfunctions - cracked wheels and brake defects - forced withdrawal of entire Acela fleet, twice;
- Amtrak bungled Acela procurement and spent millions on resulting litigation;
- GAO found that Amtrak spends \$2 for every \$1 in revenue from food and beverage service.

For more details of Amtrak's failures on the NEC, read the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Report: "[Sitting on our Assets: The Federal Government's Misuse of Taxpayer-Owned Assets.](#)"

## FLAT NORTHEAST CORRIDOR RIDERSHIP

Despite managing this vital transportation asset for decades, Amtrak has failed to effectively grow its NEC passenger service. In fact, Amtrak ridership in the NEC in 2010 was actually lower than it was in 1977.

Amtrak Ridership (in millions)					
From Amtrak Annual & Monthly Reports					
Year	NEC Spine	Long Distance		State Supported	Total
1972					16.6
1973					16.9
1974					18.2
1975					17.4
1976					18.2
1977	10.6	4.0		4.6	19.2
1978					18.9
1979					21.4
1980					21.2
1981					20.6
1982					19.0
1986	10.7	5.1		4.4	20.2
1987	10.7	5.1		4.4	20.4
1988	11.2	5.4		4.8	21.4
1989	11.1	5.5		4.7	21.3
1990	11.2	5.8		5.2	22.2
1991	10.9		11.1		22.0
1992	10.1		11.2		21.3
1993	10.3		11.8		22.1
1994	11.7	6.3		3.2	21.2
1995	11.6	6.1		3.0	20.7
1996	11.0	5.4		3.3	19.7
1997	11.1	5.4		3.7	20.2
1998	11.9	5.6		3.6	21.1
1999	12.3	5.5		3.7	21.5
2000	12.9	5.5		4.1	22.5
2003	11.0	3.9		9.7	24.6
2004	10.9	3.7		10.2	24.8
2005	9.5	3.8		10.8	24.1
2006	9.5	3.8		11.3	24.5
2007	10.4	3.9		12.3	26.6
2008	10.7	4.2		13.8	28.7
2009	10.0	4.2		13.1	27.3
2010	10.5	4.5		14.1	29.1

# MAKING THE CASE FOR THE NORTHEAST CORRIDOR

*Without question, the NEC represents the best opportunity for real high-speed rail in the United States. Here's why:*

## **POPULATION DENSITY:**

- Home to 4 of the 10 most populous metro regions in the U.S.;
- Nearly 20% of the U.S. population in just 2% of the nation's land area;
- By 2050, NEC population is expected to grow by 18 million people.

## **CRIPPLING TRANSPORTATION CONGESTION IN OTHER MODES:**

- 70 % of chronically delayed flights in U.S. emanate from NY-area airspace;
- Addressing this airspace congestion would benefit entire aviation system;
- I-95 is one of the most consistently congested interstates in the nation;
- Over 60% of NEC urban road miles are considered to be heavily congested;
- In northern half of the corridor, 70% of highways are operating at over 3/4 of design capacity.

## **ABUNDANT TRANSIT CONNECTIVITY:**

- All major NEC cities have fixed rail transit and commuter rail service;
- 5 largest NEC cities account for 80% of total rail transit ridership nationwide;
- Highest commuter rail ridership in America, carrying more than 300 million passengers in 2009;
- Highest incidence of population and jobs within 2 miles of commuter rail stations.

## **MOST PRODUCTIVE REGION OF THE NATION:**


- NEC accounts for 4 of the 10 most productive metro regions in U.S.;
- Region accounts for 1/5 of the nation's GDP;
- Business travel, critical to high-speed rail success, is highest in places with the most productive economies.

## **ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS:**

- Around the world and in the U.S., high-speed rail and rail transit have brought increased investment and development, higher property values, and other economic benefits.

## OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

The Obama Administration's disastrous launch of a national high-speed rail program derailed from the beginning and has gone in entirely the wrong direction. As the first \$10.5 billion in rail grants were awarded by the Federal Railroad Administration, it became evident FRA was not a suitable grantmaking agency. Unfortunately, in the first \$8 billion round of grant awards, Amtrak hijacked 76 of the 78 projects. Instead of focusing on key corridors, scarce federal dollars were spread too thin among too many slow-speed projects that provide little benefit to rail passengers and the US economy.



The most serious failure of the Obama Administration may have been the lack of investment in the NEC, where high-speed rail makes the most sense. It was not until March 14, 2011, after the \$10.5 billion in rail grants had already been awarded, that the Obama Administration named the NEC a high-speed rail corridor.

The President has called for an unrealistic and unnecessary goal of providing 80 percent of Americans access to high-speed rail within 25 years. If the President is truly serious about this modern transportation alternative, why did the Administration fail to even designate the NEC as a high-speed corridor until years after the initiation of the program? The Administration virtually ignored the NEC and any potential for the private sector to bring its resources to the table. The project selection process in the Administration's program was done behind closed doors, without accountability.

Because the Administration selected questionable projects, the Governors of Ohio, Wisconsin, and Florida rejected federal funds, and the California project looks troubled as well. Our nation is already decades behind Europe and Asia in developing high-speed service, and we are headed in the wrong direction. Now the Obama Administration has proposed spending an additional \$53 billion over the next six years on passenger rail projects without a realistic plan to achieve high-speed rail. The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. Given the Administration's current record, supporting President Obama's proposal is like giving Bernie Madoff another chance at handling your investment portfolio.

## U.S. HIGH-SPEED RAIL: STUCK AT THE STATION

After 40 years of Soviet-style Amtrak management, the NEC continues to fall far short of international standards.

### America vs. Our Competitors slow out of the starting gate



Paris to London: 306 miles 2hrs, 15min 186MPH



Tokyo to Osaka: 320 miles 2 hrs, 25 min 169MPH



DC to New York: 225 miles 2hrs, 42min 83MPH

## INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION SUCCESS STORIES

Internationally, the private sector successfully operates passenger rail and is profitable. It is important that the U.S. learn from both the successes and errors of other countries' high-speed rail initiatives.

In 2004, private sector operator Virgin Rail began providing rail service in Great Britain. The company doubled the London to Manchester corridor's ridership in six years, with employment increases from 2,800 to 3,500. From a 2004 debt of \$406.9 million, Virgin Rail in 2010 returned to the government a payment of \$244 million and \$81 million to investors.

Similarly, in Japan, after privatization in 1987, annual total ridership for JR Central, which operates the Tokyo to Osaka high-speed rail line, has increased from 102 million to 151 million riders, while revenues have increased 52% from 1988 to 2008. The Tokyo to Osaka line is the world's first high-speed rail line, running a substantially longer distance in less time than Amtrak's DC to New York route.

It's time for a new direction in the critical NEC transportation corridor.

International Competition Success							
Country	Structure	Ridership Information			Line Distances	Travel Time	Profitability
United Kingdom West Coast Line Virgin Rail	Competitive operations	2004 14 million	2010 28.6 million	100% increase	London -- Manchester 184 miles	2 hours	In past six years, went from \$406.9 million in debt to \$244.1 million paid to the government and \$81.4 million in Virgin profits.
Japan JR Central	Regionalized -- private operators	2004 132 million	2010 138 million	5% increase	Tokyo -- Osaka 320 miles	2 hrs, 25 min	In the twenty years since privatization in 1987, revenues have increased 52%.
United States Amtrak	Government- subsidized monopoly	2004 10.9 million	2010 10.5 million	4% decrease	D.C. -- New York 225 miles New York -- Boston 230 miles	D.C. -- New York 2 hrs, 45 min New York -- Boston 3 hrs, 30 min	Taxpayers subsidize each Amtrak ticket at an average of \$54.48.

## MICA / SHUSTER PLAN VS. AMTRAK'S "VISION"

In September 2010, Amtrak released its "Vision for High-Speed Rail in the Northeast Corridor." The proposal is estimated to cost \$117 billion and would take 30 years to fully implement. This is a staggering cost and America can't afford to wait 30 years.

The Mica / Shuster NEC competition plan uses head-to-head competition to provide the highest level of improved service at the lowest cost to the federal government.

**The Future of High-Speed Rail**

**Amtrak's "Vision"**

~~2040~~

~~\$117 Billion~~

~~Amtrak Monopoly~~

**VS.**

**Mica/Shuster NEC Competition Initiative**

*1/3 Time + PPP = Real HSR < \$*

A Third of the Time, Plus Public-Private Partnerships = Real High-Speed Rail & Taxpayer Savings

# “A NEW DIRECTION”

## MICA/SHUSTER NORTHEAST CORRIDOR COMPETITION SUMMARY

*By leveraging private sector investment, increasing competition, and opening the door to public-private partnerships (PPP's), we can finally bring real high-speed rail to the NEC, in a third of the time and at significantly less cost.*

### **END THE AMTRAK MONOPOLY:**

- Separates the NEC from Amtrak, spinning it off as a separate business unit;
- Transfers the title for the NEC to US DOT, including all assets, property, and trains;
- US DOT enters into 99-year lease with Northeast Corridor Executive Committee;
- Executive Committee manages NEC infrastructure and operations.

### **BRING PRIVATE SECTOR EXPERTISE AND FINANCING TO THE TABLE:**

- Requires a competitive bidding process for development of high-speed rail on the NEC;
- Allows private sector to recommend best PPP framework;
- Establishes performance standards for competitive bidding process:
  - Real high-speed rail on NEC – less than 2 hours between WDC and NYC;
  - Double total intercity rail traffic on NEC;
  - Highest level of private sector participation and financing;
  - Lowest level of Federal funding;
  - Full implementation in 10 years or less;
- Winning bids selected by NEC Executive Committee.

### **PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST:**

- 5-member NEC Executive Committee represents federal and state interests;
- All current commuter and freight operators on NEC are protected.

### **THE TIME IS NOW:**

- NEC high-speed rail in one third of the time as Amtrak's proposal, with firm deadlines;
- Within 18 months of enactment, the NEC will transition from Amtrak monopoly to PPP.

### **CREATE AND PROTECT JOBS:**

- New jobs for rail construction and operations;
- New jobs associated with development around rail stations;
- Hiring preference to any displaced Amtrak employees.


## **PART II: INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL COMPETITION: STATE-SUPPORTED CORRIDOR SERVICES**

Fifteen states around the country currently pay Amtrak to operate intercity passenger rail. These State-supported corridors are short, less than 750 miles in length, and exist because the States are committed to passenger rail options and are willing to pay for these services. Unlike the Northeast Corridor, most State-supported routes run on track owned by freight railroads.

Ridership on State-supported corridors has grown substantially, from 3 million riders in 1995 to 14.1 million in 2010. However, these routes still require federal subsidy, and there is room for improvement in service quality and financial performance.

The 2008 Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act required that Amtrak and the States develop a standardized method for allocating the costs associated with State-supported corridor services. This new allocation model will give private sector companies a transparent and public baseline of Amtrak's costs, which they can then bid against in open competition.

Allowing open competition for rail services, including train operations, maintenance, food and beverage, and other activities, will ensure that States get the best possible deal, and will force Amtrak to improve its services or be left behind.



## State-Supported Routes

### Route Names and City-Pair Origins & Destinations

<i>Ethan Allen Express</i>	<i>New York to Rutland, VT</i>	<i>Illinois Zephyr</i>	<i>Quincy, IL to Chicago</i>
<i>Vermonteer</i>	<i>Washington, DC to St. Albans, VT</i>	<i>Hiawatha Service</i>	<i>Chicago to Milwaukee, WI</i>
<i>Maple Leaf</i>	<i>New York to Toronto</i>	<i>Wolverine</i>	<i>Chicago to Pontiac, MI</i>
<i>Empire Service</i>	<i>New York to Niagara Falls, NY</i>	<i>Blue Water</i>	<i>Chicago to Port Huron, MI</i>
<i>Adirondack</i>	<i>New York to Montreal, ON</i>	<i>Pere Marquette</i>	<i>Chicago to Grand Rapids, MI</i>
<i>Downeaster</i>	<i>Portland, ME to Boston</i>	<i>Heartland Flyer</i>	<i>Oklahoma City to Ft. Worth, TX</i>
<i>Keystone Service</i>	<i>New York to Harrisburg, PA</i>	<i>Hoosier State</i>	<i>Chicago to Indianapolis, IN</i>
<i>Pennsylvanian</i>	<i>New York to Pittsburgh</i>	<i>Missouri River Runner</i>	<i>Kansas City, MO to St. Louis, MO</i>
<i>Carolinian</i>	<i>Charlotte, NC to New York</i>	<i>Pacific Surfliner</i>	<i>San Diego to San Luis Obispo, CA</i>
<i>Piedmont</i>	<i>Charlotte, NC to Raleigh, NC</i>	<i>San Joaquins</i>	<i>Bakersfield, CA to Sacramento/San Francisco</i>
<i>Lincoln Service</i>	<i>Chicago to St. Louis, MO</i>	<i>Capitol Corridor</i>	<i>San Jose, CA to Sacramento/Auburn</i>
<i>Illini/Saluki</i>	<i>Chicago to Carbondale, IL</i>	<i>Knowledge Corridor</i>	<i>New Haven, CT to Springfield, MA</i>
<i>Mid-Atlantic Regional</i>	<i>Washington, DC to Lynchburg and Newport News, VA</i>	<i>Cascades</i>	<i>Eugene, OR to Vancouver, BC</i>

## COMMUTER RAIL COMPETITION

Currently, almost half of the nation's commuter railroads are operated under contracts with private companies. This competitive environment has resulted in ridership growth and cost savings for States and local agencies.

<b>Commuter Rail Competition</b>				
Line	Privatization	Ridership Growth	09 Passenger Trips	Additional Information
MBTA Boston	Operating contract to Massachusetts Bay Railroad Company (consortium of Veolia and Bombardier)	1.73% average annual ridership increase over last 5 years.	40.6 million	Amtrak refused to bid on operating contract when MBTA put out tender in 2003 making it clear the agency was open to private sector operators.
Tri-Rail South Florida	Operating contract to Veolia, 2007-2014 with 3 option years.	10.8% average annual ridership increase over last 5 years	4.2 million	Veolia won contract with \$97 million contract; Amtrak's bid was \$162 million (\$69 million higher).
Virginia Railway Express	Operating contract with Keolis for 5 years, beginning in June 2010.	1.43% average annual ridership increase over last 5 years	3.9 million	Keolis bid \$85 million, about \$1 million less than Amtrak. This is the company's first U.S. operating contract.
Sounder Commuter Rail, Seattle WA	Operated by BNSF Railway	18.4% average annual ridership increase over last 5 years	2.5 million	Sounder commuter rail service initiated in 2000, has always been operated by BNSF (and operates over BNSF rail lines)
Trinity Railway Express, Dallas to Ft. Worth	Operated by Herzog	6.6% average annual ridership increase over last 5 years	2.7 million	Operating and maintenance contract awarded to private operator Herzog since Trinity Railway Express began operations in 1997
Altamont Commuter Express, Stockton-San Jose	Operated by Herzog	5.6% average annual ridership increase over last 5 years	800 thousand	Herzog won contract with a \$5.37 million bid that was 48% lower than Amtrak's \$10.32 million bid

States deserve the same opportunity to save money and enjoy improved service through open competition on their intercity passenger rail corridors.

## COMPETITIVE OPPORTUNITIES

This initiative will allow States to competitively bid for services. Activities that could be performed by the private sector include:



Maintenance of way



Maintenance of Equipment



Operations



Sales and Marketing



Scheduling



Call Centers



Onboard Service

# “A NEW DIRECTION”

## MICA / SHUSTER INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL COMPETITION SUMMARY

*By encouraging private companies to compete on Amtrak State-supported routes, this initiative will give States greater control over their passenger rail services, save money, and improve service.*

### **CREATE COMPETITION AND IMPROVE SERVICE:**

- Promotes competition by encouraging States to initiate a competitive procurement process for a menu of services;
- Incentivizes competition by redirecting funds from Amtrak to State DOTs;
- Establishes an expert panel for recommending competitive best practices.

### **SAVE TAXPAYER DOLLARS:**

- Allows States to keep money saved through competitive bid process;
- Saves federal taxpayer dollars by requiring a new allocation process in 2020 to reflect cost savings achieved through competition.

### **PROTECT FREIGHT RAILROAD INTERESTS:**

- Involves host freight railroads through market-driven access negotiations.

### **CREATE AND PROTECT JOBS:**

- Requires States to maintain current levels of service;
- Creates private sector jobs;
- Provides hiring preference to any potentially displaced Amtrak employees.




## **PART III: LONG-DISTANCE PASSENGER RAIL COMPETITION**

The worst offenders of Amtrak's mismanaged system are its long-distance routes, defined as routes of 750 miles or more in length. Every one of these 15 long-distance routes operates at a loss, which totaled \$527.3 million dollars in 2010. For example, the Sunset Limited, traveling between New Orleans and Los Angeles, lost \$407.92 per passenger in 2010. The average loss per passenger on these long-distance routes is \$117.84. In total, the long-distance routes account for three-quarters of Amtrak's operating losses.

Amtrak runs a deficit every year, and because there is no competition and taxpayers subsidize its inefficiencies, it has no real incentive for improvement.

It is time for a new direction. Amtrak's failing long-distance routes need to be deregulated and opened to competition to reduce the burden on taxpayers and improve service for the traveling public.





<b>Long-Distance Subsidy</b>				
Route	City Pairs	Net Operating Loss	Ridership	Subsidy Per Passenger
Silver Star	New York - Miami	\$46,500,000	393,586	\$118.14
Cardinal	Chicago - New York	\$15,200,000	107,053	\$141.99
Silver Meteor	New York - Miami	\$39,100,000	352,286	\$110.99
Empire Builder	Seattle - Chicago	\$56,200,000	533,493	\$105.34
Capitol Limited	Chicago - Washington D.C.	\$20,600,000	218,956	\$94.08
California Zephyr	San Francisco - Chicago	\$52,100,000	377,876	\$137.88
Southwest Chief	Los Angeles - Chicago	\$57,700,000	342,403	\$168.51
City of New Orleans	Chicago - New Orleans	\$21,800,000	229,270	\$95.08
Texas Eagle	Chicago - Los Angeles	\$27,100,000	287,164	\$94.37
Sunset Limited	Los Angeles - Orlando	\$37,400,000	91,684	\$407.92
Coast Starlight	Seattle - Los Angeles	\$47,100,000	444,205	\$106.03
Lake Shore Limited	Chicago - New York/Boston	\$35,000,000	364,460	\$96.03
Palmetto	New York - Savannah	\$13,800,000	189,468	\$72.84
Crescent	New York - New Orleans	\$40,200,000	298,688	\$134.59
AutoTrain	Lorton, VA - Sanford, FL	\$18,500,000	244,252	\$75.74
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>527,300,000</b>	<b>4,474,844</b>	<b>\$117.84 (avg)</b>

Source: Amtrak Monthly Performance Report, September 2010

# “A NEW DIRECTION”

## MICA/SHUSTER LONG-DISTANCE PASSENGER RAIL COMPETITION SUMMARY

By finally bringing competition to Amtrak’s least successful routes, this initiative seeks to reduce federal subsidies and improve service for the American taxpayer and the traveling public.

### **CREATE COMPETITION AND IMPROVE SERVICE:**

- Promotes competition by allowing private sector operators to compete with Amtrak to operate long-distance routes;
- Requires winning bids to be selected based upon the lowest possible level of Federal support.
- Allows private sector operators to make a profit, incentivizing improved service and ridership growth.

### **SAVE TAXPAYER DOLLARS:**

- Mandates that operating subsidies for contracted long-distance services be lower than Amtrak subsidies.

### **PROTECT FREIGHT RAILROAD INTERESTS:**

- Involves host freight railroads through market-driven access negotiations.

### **CREATE AND PROTECT JOBS:**

- Creates private sector jobs.
- Provides hiring preference to any potentially displaced Amtrak employees;

## DEREGULATING INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL

The Mica/Shuster initiatives to create competition in high-speed rail and intercity passenger rail service for America will have the effect of deregulating passenger rail. Over the last thirty years, we've learned that too much government involvement in an industry can drive it into the ground, while opening markets can grow the industry and the economy.

Other transportation modes have flourished under deregulation, including:



**Aviation** – Deregulated under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978



**Freight Rail** – Deregulated under the Staggers Rail Act of 1980



**Trucking** – Deregulated under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995

While some claim Amtrak was created because private industry did not want to provide passenger service and will not want to do so now, they ignore key facts. Before deregulation:



- The entire rail industry was suffocating under a strict regulatory structure that limited their ability to respond to market forces.

- Passenger rail services dwindled as air travel became common and the Interstate Highway System was built.

Times have changed. Freight rail is deregulated and flourishing, while air and highway travel is congested and struggling to increase capacity. On many corridors around the country, demand for passenger rail now exists and the private sector is ready to supply it – the market is ripe for passenger rail competition.

By breaking the Amtrak monopoly, the private sector will be unleashed to provide services in a free-market environment.

Increased competition will create jobs, improve passenger rail efficiency and service, increase innovation, and drive down costs to the federal government, State partners, and passengers.

## NOTES:

# HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE



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