TESTIMONY

OF

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BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

OF THE

HOUSE TRANSPORTATION & INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE

FRIDAY, MARCH 11, 2011
10:00 A.M.
2167 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Brown, and Members of the Subcommittee. I am Stephen Gardner, Vice President for Policy and Development of Amtrak. Unfortunately, Joseph Boardman, our President and Chief Executive Officer, could not be here today, but he sends his regards and enthusiasm for continuing to work with you to advance intercity passenger and high-speed rail.

On a personal note, this is something of a homecoming for me. My eight year career on the Hill began with an internship for this Subcommittee in 2001. Later, as a senior professional staff member for the Senate Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Operations and Safety, I had the privilege of working with the Chairman and Ranking Member, and many others in this room, on the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (PRIIA), which was enacted in October 2008 with broad bi-partisan support. I thank them and you for leadership in and support for the enactment of PRIIA, and for the invitation to appear today to discuss how to increase private sector participation in passenger rail.

Amtrak's Progress Since the Enactment of PRIIA

The two-and-a-half years since the enactment of PRIIA have been an extraordinary time for high-speed and intercity passenger rail service in the United States. While most of the attention has focused on projects for new and higher speed services, and on the inevitable bumps in the road in bringing them to fruition, I would like to take a moment to talk about what Amtrak has accomplished during this period.

First, although enactment of PRIIA coincided with the beginning of what is often called the Great Recession, Amtrak's ridership and revenue have both increased. Despite lower gas prices and a struggling economy, last year's ridership broke the all-time record Amtrak set in FY08. This year's ridership is running 6% above last year's record level, and has recently been trending higher due to the spike in gas prices. Our $2.51 billion in revenues in FY10 set another record, and ticket revenue in the first five months of FY11 is running 11.3% above last year.

Operational performance has improved as well. Amtrak's on-time performance increased from 71% in FY08 to 80% in FY09, and to 82% last year. We believe that the PRIIA provisions directed at on-time performance, including Section 213, which gave the Surface Transportation Board jurisdiction to enforce Amtrak's statutory preference over freight trains, have played an important role in this accomplishment.

Amtrak has worked diligently to fulfill our PRIIA requirements. We have met or beaten nearly all of our deadlines, despite the challenges of limited staffing and the wave of additional work accompanying the opportunities presented by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) and the FRA's High-Speed and Intercity Passenger Rail grant program. These requirements include developing new performance measurements and costing methodologies, and completion of approximately a dozen studies. Among other things, we:

- worked with the FRA to develop and institute tracking of the performance metrics and standards required by Section 207 of PRIIA;
- are working with states and the FRA on the new costing methodologies for state-supported trains, and commuter services on the Northeast Corridor, required by Sections 209 and 212 of PRIIA; and
- published and began implementation of the first round of performance improvement plans for our 15 long distance trains, focusing first on the five lowest-performing trains as required by Section 210 of PRIIA. These plans identify changes and opportunities that could significantly improve these routes, such as the proposed restructuring of the *Sunset Limited* and *Texas Eagle* services which would significantly increase ridership and improve cost

recovery. Many of these opportunities are now dependent upon our ongoing negotiations with our host railroads to implement these plans.

Why Amtrak Was Created and Acquired the NEC

In focusing on the topic of this hearing – what needs to be done to encourage more private sector involvement in passenger rail service – I believe it is helpful to consider the historical backdrop regarding the private sector's role in intercity passenger rail service both before and since the creation of Amtrak.

The reason Congress enacted the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (RPSA) that created Amtrak was that the operation of intercity passenger rail service was no longer a viable private sector business. Vast improvements in highways and aviation after World War II, made possible by huge federal investments in those modes, resulted in dramatic declines in the number of rail passengers. By the mid 1950s, the private sector had ceased investing in passenger rail service, and by 1970 every one of the two dozen private railroads still operating intercity passenger trains was incurring huge operating losses.

Congress and the Nixon Administration considered a number of alternatives for preserving and improving intercity passenger rail service, including providing funding directly to the private railroads. Ultimately, it was decided to create what became Amtrak, an entity that is predominantly federally owned but is operated like a private company. Congress perceived a need for a single national passenger rail service provider with a mission to improve passenger rail service that could operate an interconnected network of routes, and would achieve benefits and efficiencies from unified marketing and support services.

While Amtrak initially contracted with the private railroads to operate its trains, Congress quickly decided this approach was too costly and did not provide sufficient control to ensure acceptable levels of service. Accordingly, a 1972 amendment to the RPSA, now codified at 49 USC 24305(a)(2), required Amtrak to operate and control directly, to the extent practicable, all aspects of its passenger rail transportation. In 1976, when the bankrupt Penn Central Railroad was relieved of responsibility for operation and maintenance of most of the Northeast Corridor, Congress, after again considering other options, decided that the 363 miles of the Northeast Corridor owned by Penn Central should be controlled, operated, and upgraded for high-speed service by Amtrak.

Since the Northeast Corridor shifted from private sector to Amtrak ownership in 1976, we have electrified the entire route; significantly increased the number of Amtrak trains operated; and accommodated even larger increases in commuter train operations. We have increased maximum speeds from 90 mph to 150 mph between New Haven and Boston, and from 110 mph to 135 mph between New York and Washington.

In the 10 years since the introduction of high-speed *Acela Express* service, Amtrak's share of the air/rail market in the Northeast Corridor – the percentage of passengers traveling by plane or train who choose Amtrak – has increased exponentially. As indicated in the following table, Amtrak's air/rail market share has grown from 37% to 69% between New York and Washington, meaning that we've already captured more than two-thirds of the existing air/rail market. Our air-rail market share between New York and Boston has grown even faster – from 20% in 2000 to 52% in 2010 – due to electrification and the higher speeds at which the *Acela Express* trains operate.

Washington to New York Air-Rail Market



Under every conceivable measure of performance, the Northeast Corridor has experienced dramatic improvements during Amtrak's 35-year stewardship. While the Corridor has not yet achieved the speeds or levels of service realized in other countries, there is a reason for that: the United States has lagged far behind all of those countries when it comes to investments in intercity and high-speed passenger rail.

Federal Funding of Intercity Passenger Rail Before PRIIA and ARRA

The graph below shows total federal funding – including operating and capital – for intercity passenger rail service in each year from 1971, the inception of Amtrak, through 2008, the fiscal year that preceded the enactment of both PRIIA and ARRA. It might make a good elevation diagram for a roller coaster – even though it rarely gets very high – but it's no way to run a railroad.



What you see when you look at the graph is that federal funding for intercity passenger rail service – unlike funding for other modes – has been inconsistent and inadequate since Amtrak's inception. In many years, the level of funding provided to Amtrak was barely sufficient to cover operating losses, leaving little or no money for any capital expenditures even to replace worn out assets, let alone improve service.

What the graph does not show is that, even at its highest levels – the $1.7 billion peak briefly achieved in the late 1990s – U.S. investment in passenger rail service has been a fraction of what nearly every other developed and developing country has been spending. According to the President's recent 2012 budget request, China has been spending between $70 billion and $100 billion per year to develop its high speed rail system, and Spain – which has less than one-sixth the population of the United States – is investing around $13 billion per year in high-speed rail.

The passenger rail funding made available by PRIIA and ARRA has begun the process of leveling the playing field, but there is still a long way to go. The nearly $30 billion in general revenues that have been pumped into the Highway Account of the Highway Trust Fund since FY08 to keep the fund from becoming insolvent represent almost as much federal money as Amtrak has received for capital and operating expenses throughout its entire 40-year existence.

As they say, "You get what you pay for". Until the last two years, the United States has spent very little on intercity passenger rail compared to other countries, and to other transportation modes such as highways and aviation. The intercity passenger rail system we have today reflects this. What Amtrak has achieved in the Northeast Corridor and elsewhere is no small accomplishment in light of the funding provided.

Private Sector Involvement in Passenger Rail Service Since 1971

Using the private sector to advance high-speed rail projects is not a new idea. Over the past four decades, there have been numerous proposals for private sector involvement in the financing, construction and operation of new high-speed rail lines, including serious efforts by established passenger rail operators and states to develop high-speed rail lines in Florida, Texas and Southern California. All of them foundered for the same reason: lack of financial viability in the absence of significant federal funding.

However, the creation of Amtrak did not bring an end to private operation of intercity passenger rail service. While the RPSA makes Amtrak our country's national passenger railroad, it does not give Amtrak any exclusive rights to operate intercity passenger trains. Since Amtrak's inception in 1971, private companies have initiated operation of more than a dozen conventional speed intercity passenger rail services, primarily in niche markets, without public funding support. Most ceased operation after a short period due to financial problems. The most noteworthy was the original Autotrain Corporation, a private company that carried passengers and their vehicles between Northern Virginia and Sanford, Florida from 1971 until it went bankrupt and was liquidated in 1981. (Amtrak's *Auto Train* has operated between the same points since 1983.) Only one of these privately funded services is still operating: the New York City-to-Atlantic City *ACES* train, which has required state subsidies due to higher than anticipated operating losses.

Amtrak generally supports such efforts to augment today's current intercity passenger network. In fact, we are presently working with several private companies that wish Amtrak to assist them in operating other intercity services, including the proposed *Greenbrier Express* between Washington and the Greenbrier resort in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. Section 216 of PRIIA encourages Amtrak to pursue operation of privately-funded special trains to minimize federal funding requirements.

Amtrak and the Private Sector

Amtrak's intercity passenger rail service is comprised of three business lines:

- the high-speed Boston-to-Washington Northeast Corridor, all but 56 miles of which Amtrak owns or maintains/dispatches;
- state-supported and other up-to-750-mile corridor services, which account for more than two-thirds of Amtrak's daily trains; and
- 15 long distance routes that provide the only intercity passenger rail service in 23 states and 223 communities, most in rural areas, and account for 44% of Amtrak's passenger miles.

Amtrak's intercity trains, and the four commuter services we operate under contract for regional transportation authorities, are directly operated by our 20,000 employees. However, Amtrak is heavily dependent on privately owned companies that provide a wide variety of goods and services required for our daily operations. Last year, Amtrak purchased over $1.5 billion in goods and services from the private sector. The federal investment in Amtrak – in particular, the $1.3 billion Amtrak received under ARRA for vital capital projects – has spurred an enormous amount of private sector economic activity, and created or preserved many private sector jobs in addition to the 2,800 Amtrak jobs that have resulted from ARRA.

While the RPSA and Amtrak's labor agreements place limits on Amtrak's ability to contract out services, Amtrak does utilize many contracted services supplied by private sector companies. For example, all of Amtrak's commissary services for our on-train food services are provided by a private company, and Amtrak contracts with private companies, including short line railroads, to perform turnaround servicing and daily maintenance of Amtrak equipment at certain outlying terminals.

On state-supported corridor routes, states can and do contract with private companies to provide services other than train operations. For example, food service on the Boston-to-Portland, Maine *Downeaster* service is provided by a private company, and the North Carolina-owned equipment used on the Raleigh-to-Charlotte *Piedmont* route is maintained by the state's contractor.

Amtrak has also been pursuing partnerships with the private sector. We formed a consortium with SNCF, the French national railroad, and Bechtel, an international engineering and construction firm, to pursue a design, build, operate and maintain contract for the proposed but now halted Orlando-to-Tampa high-speed rail project. We plan to participate in other joint efforts with private companies to pursue high-speed rail projects elsewhere. We have also reached out to leading companies around the world to seek their feedback on the "Vision for High-Speed Rail in the Northeast Corridor" study we released in September 2010, the realization of which would require significant private sector participation and financing.

PRIIA and Private Sector Participation

In my two years as Amtrak's Vice President for Policy and Development, I have spent a great deal of time meeting with domestic and international railroad suppliers and operators. The $11.8 billion in additional federal funding for intercity and high-speed rail capital projects appropriated during the past two years, and the unprecedented support for passenger rail from the Administration and many members of Congress, have spurred private sector interest in passenger rail that would have been unimaginable just three years ago. With an unemployment rate hovering near 9%; future oil supplies uncertain; and highway and air congestion that will only get worse, this is very welcome news not just for passenger rail but for our country as well.

In addition to creating the high-speed and intercity passenger rail programs funded by ARRA and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, PRIIA contains several provisions to facilitate increased private sector participation in intercity passenger rail service. For example:

- Section 214 of PRIIA creates an Alternate Passenger Rail Service Pilot Program that would allow one or more private railroads over which Amtrak operates to receive federal operating subsidies in return for assuming responsibility for the operation of up to two intercity passenger rail routes currently operated by Amtrak.

- Section 217 of PRIIA would allow states that select an entity other than Amtrak to operate a state-supported intercity passenger rail route to request use of Amtrak facilities, equipment and services necessary to operate that route, with the Surface Transportation Board responsible for resolving any disputes.

- Section 502 of PRIIA required the FRA to solicit private sector proposals for development of federally designated high-speed rail corridors, which the FRA did in 2009. The Northeast Corridor, which is not a federally-designated high-speed rail corridor, was also included, although my understanding is that the FRA did not receive any private sector proposals for development of the Northeast Corridor.

The federal/state matching grant programs established by sections 301, 302 and 501 of PRIIA – for capital investments in intercity passenger rail, congestion mitigation, and high-speed rail, respectively – also recognize the role that private entities may play in the operation of intercity passenger rail services funded by PRIIA grants. Among other things, PRIIA defines operators of services over rail infrastructure constructed or improved by PRIIA grants to be "rail carriers" for purposes of participation in the Railroad Retirement and Railroad Unemployment systems and the requirements of the Railway Labor Act.

One matter the Senate considered during the development of PRIIA, but chose not to alter in the final bill, is Amtrak's statutory access rights to the national rail system. These rights ensure Amtrak's ability to operate over rail lines owned by freight railroads and regional transportation authorities, which account for all but 655 miles of Amtrak's current 21,000 mile route system and nearly all of the rail lines on which new 125 mph or less intercity passenger rail service has been proposed. The RPSA gives these rights exclusively to Amtrak, and the Surface Transportation Board has ruled that they are not transferable or assignable to other entities.

Private freight railroads have taken strong exception to proposals to extend these statutory rights to access their property to states or other private, commercial entities. The railroads assert that they consented to the rights Amtrak received in the RPSA in return for being relieved of the legal obligation to operate passenger trains on which they were incurring significant losses, and that requiring them 40 years later to allow states or for-profit companies to use their property without their consent would dramatically alter the terms they agreed to accept, and constitute an unconstitutional taking.

Encouraging More Private Sector Involvement

Efforts to encourage increased private sector involvement and investment in intercity passenger rail service should take into account two important considerations that are illustrated by past experience in the United States and other countries.

First, private sector involvement in passenger rail service is not the silver bullet that ensures success. Competition can produce reductions in costs, but it can also lead to fragmentation of services and elimination of network efficiencies and economies of scale, which increase costs.

Internationally, many of the countries that have become world leaders in developing high-speed rail service, such as France and Spain, have chosen to expand and operate their services primarily or exclusively through government-owned entities. Conversely, Great Britain's privatization of passenger rail service and (initially) infrastructure maintenance triggered safety, maintenance and customer service issues that took years to resolve and increased public funding requirements.

Closer to home, public subsidies and wage costs increased after a joint venture entity replaced Amtrak as the operator of Boston-area commuter service in 2003. Massachusetts' lieutenant governor has recently indicated that the state may assume direct operation of the service to remedy service deficiencies.

The table below shows farebox recovery – the percentage of operating costs covered by ticket or farebox revenues – for passenger railroads in the United States for 2009, the most recent year for which non-Amtrak data is available.



You probably expect me to point out that Amtrak has by far the highest reported farebox recovery of any U.S. passenger railroad: 74% in 2009 and 76% in 2010. I'm sure that would surprise a lot of people. But what is also noteworthy is that the larger commuter rail systems, most of which are operated directly by state and regional transportation authorities and provide service over multiple routes, have much higher cost recoveries than smaller commuter rail systems, generally operated by private contractors, that provide service over a single route.

Second, increased private sector involvement is not a substitute for adequate, consistent and assured federal funding. To the contrary, providing adequate, consistent and assured federal funding for intercity passenger rail service is the ***only*** way to attract – and maintain – private sector participation and financing.

Private sector investors expect to realize profits from their investments. However, unlike parking garages and toll highways, existing passenger rail service in the United States – and most other countries – does not generate sufficient operating profits to pay off capital investments in equipment or infrastructure. New high-speed rail lines could generate sufficient revenues to cover operating costs, but building them will require huge expenditures many years before service begins and the first revenue dollar is generated. The only major U.S. passenger rail project funded entirely by the private sector – the Las Vegas Monorail – secured funding before the Wall Street crisis of 2008, and is presently in bankruptcy.

Not surprisingly, potential private sector participants in high-speed rail service have emphasized that significant public funding is an essential prerequisite to private sector involvement in high-speed rail. The private sector goes to where the money is and, in the United States, the federal money has gone primarily to highways and aviation. That has to change to attract private sector interest and investments in passenger rail.

Revitalizing the Supplier Base

Adequate and consistent federal funding are also essential to revitalizing the U.S. supplier base for intercity passenger rail, and creating skilled, well paying manufacturing jobs in this country.

Equipment manufacturing is one example. Building passenger railcars requires costly specialized facilities and a skilled workforce. Between 1973 and 1980, Amtrak orders for nearly 1,000 new passenger railcars kept production lines busy at three different U.S. manufacturers.

But after 1980, the funding roller coaster lurched downward. Amtrak ordered no new equipment for nearly a decade, and all three of those manufacturers exited the industry. The same pattern occurred in the late 1990s, when Amtrak ordered a small quantity of additional equipment, including the *Acela Express* trainsets. When lack of funding precluded additional Amtrak equipment orders for another decade, the manufacturer of the Acela trainsets shuttered its Vermont plant.

The fleet strategy Amtrak issued last year, and will soon update, contemplates consistent purchases of new railcars and locomotives to replace and expand an equipment fleet whose average age is higher than at any previous time in Amtrak's history. This measured approach is both cost-efficient and supportive of the Administration's and Amtrak's goal of revitalizing the domestic passenger railcar industry. Within the past few months, we have placed orders for equipment that will replace the last of the 50- to more than 60-year old "Heritage" cars we inherited from the private railroads and for new electric locomotives for the Northeast Corridor.

Amtrak is also participating in the Next Generation Corridor Equipment Pool Committee, created by Section 305 of PRIIA and comprised of representatives of states, equipment manufacturers, FRA and Amtrak. The committee's purpose is to develop standard specifications for different equipment types and facilitate joint acquisitions of equipment to reduce costs and help revitalize the domestic industry. However, that goal – and the U.S. manufacturing jobs it would create – will not be realized unless there is a long-term federal commitment to adequately fund intercity passenger rail.

Competition Requires a Level Playing Field

The renewed private sector interest in passenger rail is a welcome development. Amtrak is not afraid of competing to operate high-speed and intercity passenger rail services. We have competed for contracts to operate commuter rail services for many years. We believe our highly skilled workforce, and our 35 years of experience in safely maintaining and operating the only high-speed rail line subject to U.S. safety requirements, position us well to become the operator of choice for any passenger rail service. When new companies seek to compete in the U.S. passenger rail market, the first thing they do is try to hire Amtrak employees.

However, competition requires a level playing field. Other companies that wish to operate passenger rail service must be subject to all of the laws and regulations that apply to Amtrak, such as the Railway Labor Act, the Railroad Retirement and Railroad Unemployment Acts, and restrictions on outsourcing work performed by U.S. workers to other countries. Foreign operators should be required to establish U.S. entities to ensure that all of the jobs created by the federal passenger rail funding they receive are based in the United States, as Amtrak's jobs are.

One area where there is not a level playing field today is liability and insurance. Federal law and DOT regulations require all interstate motor carriers of passengers – even if they operate just a single minibus – to be licensed and to maintain minimum levels of insurance. However, there are no comparable licensing or insurance requirements for passenger rail operators. Only Amtrak, which is required by the RPSA to have $200 million in insurance/self-insurance coverage, and recipients of PRIIA grants, are required to maintain *any* insurance. Other operators of passenger rail service do not have to carry insurance even if they receive funding under other federal programs. The gaps in federal law that allow unlicensed and uninsured, or significantly under-insured, operators to provide passenger rail service over the national rail network need to be closed.

<u>The Road Ahead</u>

As we look to the future, it is important to recognize that there is a mismatch between PRIIA, which was designed to preserve and improve the existing passenger rail network, and expectations for transformational growth in intercity and high-speed rail.

PRIIA was not designed for a world in which political instability in the Middle East, and the threat this poses to the country with the highest per capita consumption of oil for transportation purposes, dominates the front pages. PRIIA did not anticipate the unprecedented level of capital funding that intercity passenger rail has received over the last two years; the level of private sector interest this funding has spurred; or the bold and important plan the President recently outlined in his 2012 budget to develop high-speed and conventional intercity passenger rail corridors across the country. Nor does PRIIA address the need, identified by members of this Subcommittee from both parties and in Amtrak's 2010 "Vision for High-Speed Rail in the Northeast Corridor," to create a world-class high-speed rail system in the Northeast.

Congress needs to address the mismatch between PRIIA and current national priorities by realigning national transportation policy so that it can accommodate the new vision of transformational growth in intercity and high-speed passenger rail. At a minimum, this realigned policy framework must incorporate:

- dedicated federal funding;
- a stronger federal planning and project delivery role, including a national rail plan that defines priority projects;
- a national investment strategy that guides Federal and state planning efforts;
- closer coordination among the FRA, states, Amtrak, and host railroads in planning, project management, and project delivery; and
- safety and insurance requirements.

The President's proposal to finally integrate intercity passenger rail into surface transportation reauthorization legislation, including through the creation of a Transportation Trust Fund with a Rail Account, begins the process of developing the path that will enable realization of this new vision, a vision that will include significant private sector participation. Amtrak looks forward to working with the Subcommittee's Members and staff in developing reauthorization proposals for passenger rail, and will provide specific recommendations soon.

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Truth in Testimony Disclosure

Pursuant to clause 2(g)(5) of House Rule XI, in the case of a witness appearing in a nongovernmental capacity, a written statement of proposed testimony shall include: (1) a curriculum vitae; and (2) a disclosure of the amount and source (by agency and program) of each Federal grant (or subgrant thereof) or contract (or subcontract thereof) received during the current fiscal year or either of the two previous fiscal years by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. Such statements, with appropriate redaction to protect the privacy of the witness, shall be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness appears.

(1) Name: Stephen Gardner

(2) Other than yourself, name of entity you are representing:
Amtrak

(3) Are you testifying on behalf of an entity other than a Government (federal, state, local) entity?

YES **If yes, please provide the information requested below and attach your curriculum vitae.**

NO

(4) Please list the amount and source (by agency and program) of each Federal grant (or subgrant thereof) or contract (or subcontract thereof) received during the current fiscal year or either of the two previous fiscal years by you or by the entity you are representing:

Amtrak receives quarterly grants from the Department of Transportation/Federal Railroad Administration as a subsidy to address our operating, capital and debt service loses. While the FY 2011 fiscal year is still on a continuing resolution we have received the following amounts for the following fiscal years:

FY 2009:	**1.488**	**billion;**
ARRA:	**1.3**	**billion;**
FY 2010:	**1.55**	**billion.**

Signature

Date

Stephen J. Gardner

Experience:

2011- 2009 **National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Amtrak)** – *Vice President, Policy and Development Washington, DC.*
Build and lead new department primarily responsible for high-speed rail, state-supported service, commuter rail, and third-party business development and service planning functions for the nation's intercity passenger railroad. Direct regulatory and legislative policy initiatives, corporate strategic planning efforts, and station design functions. Manage a widely-dispersed and diverse staff of nearly 60 and collaborate with all Amtrak departments.

2009- 2004 **U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security** – *Senior Democratic Professional Staff and Democratic Professional Staff; Washington, DC.*
Responsible for Senate legislative, oversight, and policy initiatives related to railroad, motor carrier, pipeline, and hazardous materials transportation safety, security, infrastructure, and operations. Formulate and organize all Subcommittee and related full Committee hearings. Oversee and evaluate the budgets, programs, actions, and regulations of all Department of Transportation and other federal surface transportation-related agencies. Manage the full Committee's consideration of Presidential nominations for federal surface transportation positions. Promoted to Senior Staff in 2008 with additional staff management responsibilities.

2004- 2002 **U.S. Senator Tom Carper** – *Legislative Assistant for Transportation and Trade; Washington, DC.*
Developed transportation and trade legislation and policy while managing related appropriations requests. Collaborated with the Committees on Environment and Public Works; Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; and Commerce, Science, and Transportation on the reauthorization of the federal surface transportation programs and other transportation-related legislative initiatives and hearings. Managed critical district transportation projects and led the Senate Amtrak Working Group.

2002- 2001 **U.S. Representative Bob Clement** – *Legislative Assistant for Transportation and Labor; Washington, DC.*
Formulated transportation and labor legislation and policy while managing related appropriations requests. Staffed the Ranking Member of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's Subcommittee on Railroads for legislative initiatives and hearings. Managed district transportation projects including the East Corridor Commuter Rail initiative and Amtrak service restoration to Nashville, Tennessee. Led the House Amtrak Working Group.

2001 **U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure; Subcommittee on Railroads** – *Democratic Staff Intern; Washington, DC.*
Assisted Democratic Staff Director with Subcommittee initiatives including drafting legislation, preparing written statements, and staffing hearings and official proceedings.

2000 **Buckingham Branch Railroad** – *Trainman and Track Worker; Dillwyn, VA.*
Performed train service duties on mainlines and in yards on both Buckingham Branch and CSX trackage. Performed various maintenance of way tasks and assisted the Track Foreman with the management of routine projects. Performed additional work on special projects including the preparation of a new operating rules examination for transportation employees and railroad bridge maintenance.

2000- 1999 **Guilford Rail System** - *Train Operations Manager (Dispatcher); North Billerica, MA.*
Dispatched and managed all train movements and right of way access for Guilford Rail System's Maine Central Railroad. Organized data and managed transportation, clerical, and engineering personnel as the nexus of a multi-faceted network. Coordinated operations with top-level transportation management personnel; train crews; maintenance of way, communications, and signal employees; local terminals and yards; clerks, crew callers; power control; and marketing to facilitate safe and efficient operations.

1999 **Guilford Rail System** – *Conductor and Conductor Trainee; Portland, ME.*
Performed train service out of Portland, Maine's Rigby Yard and completed conductor training and rules classes in North Billerica, Massachusetts and Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Developed core competencies in the assemblage and movement of trains and cars in yard and road territories and learned the physical characteristics of Guilford's Maine Central Railroad.

1998- 1997 **The Shelburne Falls Trolley Museum** – *Assistant to the Director; Shelburne Falls, MA.*
Supported the Museum's economic development, public relations, membership and volunteer coordination, historical research, materials management, and general operations. Assisted with the preparation of various local, state, and federal grant requests and the presentation of reports to local and state government administrators.

1996 **Buckingham Branch Railroad** – *Track Worker and Brakeman; Dillwyn, VA.*
Performed basic track work and occasionally served as a brakeman on freight trains as a summer job during college.

1994- 1993 **National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Amtrak)** – *Transportation Intern; Washington, DC.*
Assisted the Division Superintendent with management and clerical duties during a year-long, part-time internship and rotated throughout various Amtrak departments observing operations, learning operating rules, and studying the fundamentals of passenger railroading.

1994- 1993 **H.B. Woodlawn Alternative Public High School** – *Outside Teacher; Arlington, VA.*
Designed and taught a course for 9th Grade students on the history of the HB Woodlawn Program and the progressive education movement in the United States.

Education:

1999- 1994 **Hampshire College** – *Bachelor of Arts; Amherst, MA.*
Area of concentration: physics, with an additional senior thesis project in political economy and social science analyzing the effectiveness of historical tourism as a means of economic growth in rural New England. Additional background in mathematics, history, and music composition. Held various teaching assistant positions and managed the College's recording studios.